Biography:

Rochelle Terman is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Her work as a Book Workshop Fellow, The Geopolitics of Shaming: When Human Rights Pressure Works—and When It Backfires, was published in 2023 with Princeton University Press. Terman's research primarily focuses on international norms and human rights. She has also explored areas like gender, Islamophobia, and computational social science. She is currently a faculty affiliate with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the Center for the Study of Gender & Sexuality, the Committee on International Relations, and the Program on Computational Social Science.

Terman earned her B.A. from the University of Chicago, and Ph.D. in Political Science with a designated emphasis in Gender & Women’s Studies from the University of California, Berkeley. She joins the University of Chicago from Stanford University, where she was a post-doc at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Every international organization (IO) advances cooperation through repeatedly concluding negotiations at regular meetings. Works of these IOs are achieved by both officials from country delegates (“domestic bureaucrats”) as well as insulated staffs (“Secretariats”). Domestic bureaucrats are both principals and agents in this context; they supervise Secretariats but at the same time are subject to monitoring from a domestic principal. However, their role here is bigger than a middle-manager in conventional bureaucracy. Their domestic principal has imperfect information about the match between domestic interest and outcome of international negotiations while their agents (Secretariats) have fundamentally different preference structure. In this sense, domestic bureaucrats are the ones who can exploit both domestic interests and IO interests. Then under what condition do domestic bureaucrats approve more discretions to Secretariats? 

With a formal model and empirical evidence from fieldwork in Geneva, Switzerland, I argue that career concerns of domestic bureaucrats can drive them delegating more discretions to Secretariats for the sake of concluding international negotiations in time. This research, through examining career concerns of domestic bureaucrats, unpacks the black box of IO bureaucracy.  

Biography:

Minju Kim is a doctoral student in the field of International Relations studying international political economy and American foreign policy. She is interested in bureaucratic politics in foreign policymaking and politics of trade remedies. She holds an MIA with the highest honors from Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, and a BA from Yonsei University. She is a recipient of the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS) doctoral study abroad scholarship. Before joining this program, she also worked at the International Legal Affairs Division of Ministry of Justice in South Korea. 

Much of the world is rapidly urbanizing, yet contemporary urbanization is often informal urbanization, creating substantial slum neighborhoods without adequate access to government services. In its absence, non-state armed actors often become substitutes for the state, and informal economies flourish. Many scholars and public officials view informal urbanization with alarm, arguing that informal communities are conflict-prone. Yet, informal urban neighborhoods exhibit substantial variation in political violence: while some experience intense periods of political violence, others are relatively peaceful. What explains this puzzling variation? 

Drawing upon fieldwork and data collection in South Africa, I analyze the causes of a particular type of political violence—violence over rents, or government resources, benefits and privileges. While most scholars stress the absence of the state in informal neighbors, I argue that government rents constitute a major part of the economies of informal communities. I argue that violence is shaped by three factors: the type and strength of informal institutions, transitions from informal to formal property rights, and as a form of signaling by communities to the state. 

I test these theories through qualitative fieldwork and gathering novel micro-level data on political violence and municipal projects in South African townships.  

Biography:

Isaac Hock is a PhD student in Political Science. His research focuses on urban violence, crime and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. He is a graduate of Swarthmore College. 

Robert Gulotty is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His first book project is Governing Trade Beyond Tariffs: The politics of multinational production and its implications for international cooperation. He is also engaged in research on the origins of the international trade regime and the effects of domestic institutions on foreign economic policymaking. This research includes a book project, Opening of the American market: rules, norms and coalitions with Judith Goldstein. Gulotty’s work appears in International Organization, The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, and The World Trade Report. He has also completed a postdoctoral fellowship with the Stanford Center for International Development and the Department of Political Science.

Biography:

Lautaro Cella is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Chicago, specializing in comparative politics and quantitative methods. His research interests include comparative political behavior, redistributive politics, and democratic erosion, with a regional focus on Latin America. Before joining the PhD program, he received a BA in Political Science from Torcuato Di Tella University, Argentina. 

Project Title: 

The Emergence of Anti-Establishment Attitudes and Protest Behavior. Theory and Evidence from Argentina and Chile.  

Abstract:

Disenchantment with political parties has become a global phenomenon. In the last five years, Argentina and Chile have witnessed an unexpected surge in anti-establishment views, protests, and votes for outsider candidates. What explains anti-establishment views and protest behavior among citizens? Much of the literature claims that the leading cause for the decline of partisanship and the success of outsiders is the policy convergence of mainstream political parties. Others point to poor incumbent performance. However, I contend that existing explanations do not tell the whole story. I argue that anti-establishment attitudes and protest behavior are predominantly driven by perceptions of generalized government underperformance in the form of repeated disappointing economic performance and corruption. When confronted with multiple political alternatives that have previously been in power and performed poorly, voters will increase their anti-establishment views and express their discontent through different methods: participating in street demonstrations, casting an invalid ballot, and supporting outsiders. An isolated economic crisis or corruption scandal is not enough for these outcomes to expand. Government underperformance must be repeated so that incumbent and non-incumbent established parties in the system become connected with it. I test my hypotheses by conducting original survey experiments in Argentina and Chile. 

Biography:

Adam Saxton is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, focusing on international relations. His research interests are at the intersection of international security and international law, with current projects looking at historic trends in declarations of war and the influence of regional non-intervention pacts in Latin America on U.S. interventions. His broader interests include rhetoric, bureaucracy, and intelligence, with his research often leveraging archival sources to provide insight on foreign policy decision-making. 
 
Before starting the PhD program, Adam was a Research Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he worked on projects related to U.S. military force posture and industrial mobilization. He has further internship experience at other think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Center for New American Security (CNAS), where he worked on issues related to technology and national security. His writings have appeared in Lawfare, The National Interest, Breaking Defense, and War on the Rocks.

Project Title: Classifying Conflicts: Legal Labels and the Use of Military Force

Abstract:

Why do states legally frame events in ways that sharply contrast with material facts on the ground? The practice of mislabeling conflicts has persisted for centuries, from the United States’ “police action” in Korea in 1950 to the Quasi-War between the United States and France in 1798. Russia’s recent “special military operation” in Ukraine is only the latest example of this behavior. This dissertation explores the phenomenon of conflict mislabeling, investigating why states choose legal terms that often diverge from the true nature of the conflict. The project sheds light on this strategic manipulation by developing a typology of label types to encompass a range of labels and their relationship to the underlying conflict. The study proposes an initial theory of label choice based on concern over conflict escalation and manipulation of the laws of war. This theory and typology are demonstrated through archival research in historical case studies drawn from the 19th and 20th centuries to assess why certain labels were chosen over others. By bridging gaps in the study of conflict, international law, and rhetoric, this research aims to reveal the complex interplay between the material realities of war and the legal frameworks used to define them.

Biography:

David Westby is a PhD candidate in the department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He received his BA from Tufts University in 2017 and his MA from the University of Chicago in 2020. 

His research interests include nationalism, populism, the intersection of sport and politics, and critical theory. Previous work includes research on radical Spanish soccer fans, called ultras, and an MA thesis on when nationalist parties become independentist. 

Project Title: Ultras and Populism

Abstract:

The recent success of extremist populist politicians has prompted concern about democratic backsliding. Trump, Bolsonaro, Erdoğan, Le Pen, Bukele, and more have tapped into widespread frustrations with modern politics. These extremist populist politicians mobilized already robust yet invisible groups of people that were primed for an anti-system message. But how were they primed? 

Existing literature suggests citizens are dissatisfied with institutional politics in liberal democracies. But little scholarship has focused on where and how such grievances are shaped into populist sentiment. I argue that the priming for populist messaging has for years been happening outside of mainstream political spaces, for example in the punk music scene, online video game communities, and churches. 

I propose to study an undertheorized space to illustrate how communities with extremist ideologies are formed in alternative social contexts. Soccer has a unique form of fandom called ultraism in which young men are mobilized by organized fan groups. Activities include coordinated visual displays and chants, travel to away games, social gatherings, and fights. Critically, ultra groups imbricate intense fandom with radical politics, cultivating extreme populist attitudes in young men searching for a north star. 

2022-23 Abstract: Public Responses to Democratic Erosion in the United States, Mexico, and Turkey 

The concept of “democratic erosion” has come to the fore in recent years, as leaders around the world have come to office by winning free and fair elections and, once in office, weaken democratic institutions, such as the press, courts, and election-administration bodies.  

These aspiring autocrats also benefit when they disparage their political systems. By making people believe that democracy is neither strong nor helpful for the general public, then it’s easier for them to, say, claim that elections are rigged even when they are not. But when aspiring autocrats trash-talk their democracies, how do we know that they succeed?  

2018-19 Abstract: Inside Out: Prison Gangs’ Criminal Governance as a Threat to State Authority 

In 2006, a prison gang held the world’s third-largest city hostage. São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital launched simultaneous rebellions in 90 prisons and hundreds of synchronized terror attacks on the streets, bringing the city to a standstill and forcing significant concessions from officials. Paradoxically, the same gang imposed a ban on unauthorized homicides throughout the urban periphery, producing a drastic decline in violence. Though extreme, the case is not exceptional: From El Salvador to Chicago, prison gangs have learned to project power beyond prison walls, organizing street-level crime, altering patterns of violence, and using that control as a bargaining chip with states. What happens when prisons—the core of the state’s coercive apparatus—become headquarters for criminal organizations? What are the policy implications when prison gangs come to govern marginalized populations more effectively than weak or absent states ever did?  

I propose a systematic assessment of the degree, variation, and impact of prison-based criminal governance on peripheral communities and the illicit markets they house. Through field visits to six Brazilian states, focus groups and interviews with residents, and training of local collaborators for ongoing research, I will produce novel observations of criminal governance across varied contexts. This will help answer critical questions: When and how did prison gangs establish control? What areas of daily life do they impinge on? How do residents feel about gang governance? What are the consequences for states that come to depend on gangs to govern not only sprawling prison systems but under-served and violent urban peripheries?  

2019-20 Abstract:

This book project explores a paradox of mass-incarceration societies: Prison, the state’s main tool for punishing crime, has become a headquarters for organizing crime, with dire consequences. For example, in May 2006, São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) prison gang launched hundreds of terror attacks on the streets and simultaneous rebellions in 90 prisons, holding the city hostage and forcing significant government concessions. Paradoxically, the same gang imposed a homicide ban in slums that cut homicide rates by 75%. Since then, PCC-type gangs have spread throughout Brazil, and Central America’s prison-based gangs have also produced extreme peaks and troughs of violence. What are the consequences when states depend on criminal organizations to govern sprawling prison systems and underserved peripheries?  

My CISSR project exploits the spread of sophisticated prison gangs to every state in Brazil, analyzing real-time changes in street-level crime, violence, and governance. As a 2018 CISSR Fellow, I established connections with Brazilian scholars whose graduate advisees are developing ethnographic research sites in different communities. In eight slums across two states, I piloted a novel “replicated ethnographic observation” methodology: each researcher completes a standardized report for their site, characterizing local prison-gang governance and the processes of gang takeover. As a returning fellow, I will replicate this methodology in 4-6 additional states. This project will produce the first systematic data on prison-based criminal governance in slum areas; strengthen an international network of gang and slum researchers; and provide a model for cross-disciplinary research into sensitive issues like gang governance. 

2017-18 Abstract: What is the effect of electoral personalism (the personal vote) on policy outcomes and party organization?

In countries throughout the world, electoral systems are based on what is known as proportional representation. Voters cast their votes for their preferred party or candidate, and legislative seats are apportioned according to the number each party/candidate receives. There are different methods of organizing electoral competition in these systems. In closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) systems, voters vote for parties, with the party leadership allocating seats according to its candidate ranking. In open-list proportional representation (OLPR), voters vote for individual candidates. A literature that is nearly three decades old has argued that because of its features, CLPR systems will be more partisan and more focused on national policy since candidates are beholden to a centralized party leadership. OLPR systems will be more candidate-centered, and politicians will place local, parochial interests before the national interest. 

The goal of this project is to reconsider this received wisdom and question whether the grip of parties over candidates in CLPR systems is as strong as the conventional wisdom discussed above suggests. 

Professor Monika Nalepa together with CISSR visitor, Jose Antonio Cheibub will organize a workshop at CISSR to explore whether the contrast between CLPR and OLPR has been overestimated in both the electoral and legislative arenas. The invited papers from a team of international political scientists will investigate why parties may play a relevant role in affecting candidate behavior in OLPR, both during the campaign and in the legislature.  

2018-19 Abstract: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democratic Representation 

How do former authoritarian elites utilize the secret information acquired by the former enforcement apparatus associated with their respective regimes? I seek to learn whether such information can be used to blackmail politicians to make policy concessions, or whether previously undisclosed information about human rights abuses can jeopardize a new democracy's chances of survival. This line of research marks a new direction in comparative politics that examines the relationship between transitional justice (TJ) and the quality of democratic representation. It focuses on policies aimed at vetting political candidates for acts of collaboration with the authoritarian regime, and possible human rights violations committed in the past. This process is known as lustration. Revealing evidence of past authoritarian wrongs may prevent former authoritarian elites from influencing policy in new democracies. In preliminary work, I show that former authoritarian elites' influence tends to decrease with severity of transitional justice, but increases as voters view politicians' involvement with the former authoritarian regime as an important issue. The work also suggests that the effectiveness of TJ policies is reduced in the absence of a free press, as the media's inability to uncover empty threats which allows former autocrats to extract policy concessions. Surprisingly, the magnitude of ideological differences between current politicians and successors of authoritarian elites has no bearing on the ability of former autocrats to extract such concessions. This research will work to develop stronger measure of TJ severity to help evaluate how transitional justice can contribute to stable democratic transitions. 

2019-20 Abstract: Autocratic Regime Institutionalization: A Global Dataset

Despite the increasing prominence of studies focusing on authoritarian institutions, accurate measures of autocratic regime institutionalization have yet to be developed, leaving researchers to depend on poor proxies for real institutional strength. In this ongoing project, Monika Nalepa and collaborators hope to fill in this missing data gap by developing a global dataset of autocratic regime institutionalization in which each country-year combination from 1960 to 2015 is scored across various dimensions of institutionalization. 

2020-21 Abstract: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability Lab 

Transitional Justice, that is the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist, has direct implications for democratic processes. It influences who decides to go into politics, shapes politicians' behavior while in office, and, finally, influences how they delegate policy decisions. That is why mechanisms of transitional justice far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime are a constitutive part of the new democratic order. How successful these democracies become at staying democracies and their overall quality is a direct consequence of transitional justice. Monika Nalepa’s is currently working on a project to test a theoretical model of post-authoritarian purges by examining the relationship between post-authoritarian purges and the quality of democracy in countries that have transitioned from authoritarian rule.